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Democracy and Denomination: Democratic values among Muslim minorities and 
the majority population in Denmark 
 
Peter Gundelach  
 
 
Abstract 
Based on a survey of ethnic minorities (immigrants as well as descendants) and 
the ethnic majority, this article analyses the distribution and explanation of 
democratic values in Denmark. Democratic values are measured according to 
three criteria: Democratic principles, democratic rights and family democracy. 
With respect to democratic rights, the analysis shows that Muslim immigrants 
and descendants score slightly lower on democratic principles and family 
democracy; however, they have more democratic values than the majority of the 
populations in Western Europe. Democratic values do not differ between 
immigrants and descendants of the same ethnic group, and differences in values 
do not depend on immigrants’ length of stay in the host society. Finally, among 
ethnic minorities of mixed religious composition, the differences between the 
Muslim parts of these groups are larger than the differences between ethnic 
groups. Thus, differences in democratic values are explained by ethnicity, not 
religion. 
 
Keywords: Immigrants; Islam; survey data; national identity, Denmark, democracy. 
 
Islam, immigrants and democracy 
 
Huntington’s (1993, 1997) famous thesis about the clash of civilizations has generated 
much debate. Huntington argues that a cultural cleft has emerged between Western and 
Islamic civilizations - a clash of cultures that is strongly related to religion. 
Huntington’s writings are perhaps best understood as a provocation, and many critics 
have argued that his thesis cannot be substantiated at macro level (cp. the debate in 
Huntington 1996).  
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 Huntington’s argument refers to large cultural entities – civilizations – but he also 
argues that clashes of civilizations might be found inside Western European countries 
as a consequence of the increase in Muslim immigrants. Huntington claims that Europe 
is threatened by ‘Islamization’ (Huntington 1996, p. 204) and ‘Muslims pose the 
immediate problem to Europe’(Huntington 1996, p. 204). According to Huntington, 
democracy is one of the important issues that divide civilizations. In particular, he 
notes that Islam is associated with authoritarian rule and Christianity with democracy.   
 However, we still lack studies that analyze a possible clash of civilisations (i.e. 
sizeable value differences) at the individual level in Western countries (for an 
exception based on the World Values Survey and consequently with very few 
respondents from ethnic minorities, see Pettersson 2007). This article addresses this 
need, using a relativ ly unique data set: A Danish survey of values among eight ethnic 
groups: Ethnic Danes and seven ethnic minorities in which all or some members are 
Muslims.  
 If Huntington’s thesis were correct, we would expect a lower level of support for 
democratic values among Muslim minorities in Western countries compared to the 
support shown by the Christian majority population. Huntington’s fear is shared by 
Fukuyama (2006) who is concerned that immigration to Western Europe - particularly 
the increasing number of Muslim immigrants - will result in a struggle between radical 
Islamism and liberal democracy.  
 Democratic values are fundamental to Western societies. Most European 
countries have references to democracy and human rights written into their 
constitutions, and democracy is codified as a principle of the European Union. The 
preamble of the 2004 draft treaty mentions ‘the inviolable and inalienable rights of the 
human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law’ (Eur-Lex, vol. 47, 
December 16, 2004, p. 3).  Even for supporters of multiculturalism, who argue that 
societies should accommodate a large variety of values based on cultural differences, 
the acceptance of parliamentary democracy and freedom of speech and religion are 
seen as a non-negotiable principles (Borowski 2000).  
 Scholars like Fukuyama and Huntington fear that immigration may create 
problems for Western democracies for at least two reasons. Firstly, in general 
immigrants come from countries that are less democratic than the Western European 
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countries they immigrate to (Puddington and Piano 2005).  This observation is 
documented in The Freedom House Survey that measures a country’s level of 
democracy according to two criteria: Political rights and civil liberties. There is some 
variation these countries’ total score but in general the score is lower than that of any 
Western European country. Even though we may be able to estimate the character of 
the regime we have very little reliable evidence about the attitudes in the general 
population in these countries. Perhaps the support for democracy among the general 
public is higher than one would expect, judging by the character of regime. At least this 
result was found by Tessler (2003) in a study of Arab countries but even so it seems 
reasonable to argue that in general the general support for democracy in these countries 
is lower than in the Western world. 
 Secondly, most of the immigrants to Western Europe come from countries that 
are dominated by Islam. Some critics argue that Islam’s relation to democracy is 
ambiguous, if not dubious. Nasr claims that the ‘Islamic view of democracy is not 
something deeply legitimate, but at best … a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining 
the power to build an Islamic state’(Nasr 2005, p. 13). By contrast, Ibrahim (2006) 
argues that ‘several crucial elements of constitutional democracy and civil society are 
also moral imperatives of Islam’(Ibrahim 2006, p. 7). The same difference of opinion is 
found at a public discursive level in Western societies both among politicians and in 
the general population. 
 This article explores whether the Fukuyama/Huntington thesis about different 
sets of values among Muslim minorities and the Christian majority population can be 
substantiated in the case of Denmark. Our analysis is based on a survey among 
immigrants, descendants, and Danes undertaken in spring, 2006. According to the 
Fukuyama/Huntington thesis, a comparison of these groups would reflect a higher level 
of democratic values among Danes than among Muslim minorities. However, the 
Fukuyama/Huntington thesis does not allow us to determine whether the level of 
democratic sentiment differs among immigrants and descendants; nor does it allow for 
differences among ethnic minority groups. That is why a set of alternative hypotheses 
is needed.  
 
Alternative hypotheses: Socialization and nation  
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An alternative to the religious hypothesis is the assumption that political socialization 
will change the values of the individual. Almond and Verba’s famous study, The Civic 
Culture (1963) argues that political socialization is a crucial mechanism for creating 
political values and skills among citizens. According to Sapiro (2004), the concept of 
political socialization had its heyday in the 1980s but has received less attention in 
recent decades. However, political socialization is becoming increasingly relevant to 
the development of political involvement and values among immigrants. A general 
socialization hypothesis suggests that the mere fact of living in a society with 
democratic institutions will teach individual citizens democratic values. 
 In order to analyse political socialization, we need to differentiate between two 
groups: Immigrants and descendants. Immigrants (including family-reunited 
individuals) are people who were born abroad and have come to Denmark either to 
work or as refugees from their home country.  In other words, they have lived only part 
of their lives in Denmark. They are expected to have a lower level of democratic 
awareness than native Danes when arriving in Denmark. Based on the political 
socialization hypothesis, however, we would expect that the longer an immigrant lives 
in Denmark, the stronger his/her democratic values will become.  
 Descendants are people who have lived in Denmark all their lives. Their 
socialization has taken place in a society with democratic institutions and a democratic 
culture. More specifically, they have gone to Danish kindergartens and schools where 
one of the official goals (formally stated in a law from 1975) is to teach pupils 
fundamental democratic principles. A comparative analysis has found that Danish 
schools emphasize ‘collaboration and consensus’ and concern themselves particularly 
with ‘education for citizenship and democracy, as well as with the academic goals of 
education’ (Osborn 2001, p. 274).  Following the political socialization hypothesis, this 
emphasis on democracy will have an impact on the values of pupils. For this reason, we 
would expect descendants to have a more positive attitude towards democracy than 
their parents (the immigrants). There would only small differences in democratic 
values between descendants of immigrants and Danes because both groups have lived 
in a democratic society all their lives. 
Page 4 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers  ethnic@surrey.ac.uk
Ethnic and Racial Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 5 
 A second alternative hypothesis focuses on the role played by ethnicity rather 
than religion in determining democratic values. Earlier research has shown that 
ethnicity has a significant influence on the individual’s values (Gundelach and 
Nørregård-Nielsen 2007). This finding may be interpreted as the result of a number of 
processes: Often, people from ethnic minorities come from the same region in the 
country of origin; they have a common destiny (be it as refugees or immigrants), and 
they are interrelated by family relations, common language and their daily interactions 
in their host country.  
 To be able to test the hypothesis about the relationship between democratic 
values and ethnicity (irrespective of religion), the ethnic group needs to reflect a 
variation of religious faiths. In some ethnic groupings, however, such differences do 
not exist. Among Turks or Pakistanis more than 95 per cent of the respondents present 
themselves as Muslims. In such cases, it would be impossible to ascertain whether it is 
the respondent’s ethnicity or his/her religion that has had the greatest influence on 
his/her democratic values or lack of such. The ethnicity hypothesis can only be tested 
in ethnic groups with a varied composition of denominations. This limits the 
investigation to immigrants from West Balkan, where our survey reflects 69 per cent to 
be Muslims; to immigrants from Iran, where 55 per cent of respondents are Muslims; 
and to immigrants from Iraq where 82 per cent of respondents are Muslims. 
 
To summarize, we operate with the following three hypotheses: 
• A religious hypothesis that claims that Muslims have fewer democratic values 
than Christians. 
• A political socialization hypothesis, which suggests that the longer a person has 
lived in Denmark the stronger his/her democratic values become. This means 
that Danes and descendants have more democratic values than immigrants, and 
that there will be little or no differences between descendants and Danes in 
terms of democratic mindset. 
• An ethnicity hypothesis that argues that in ethnic groups with different 
denominations, ethnicity is a stronger indicator of democratic values than 
religion. 
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Each of the hypotheses above will be explored in the following. As a precursor to such 
an analysis, a short introduction to immigration in Denmark appears relevant, 
describing the data and definitions of the dependent variables. 
 
Immigration to Denmark 
 
There has always been immigration to Denmark. Until the 1960s, the proportion of 
ethnic minorities was very small, making Denmark a very homogeneous country in 
terms of ethnicity. During the late 1960s, the first immigrants from Pakistan, Turkey 
and the former Yugoslavia came to Denmark as so-called ‘guest workers”. By the early 
1970s, immigration laws prevented more labour immigration, but from the mid-1980s 
onwards, Denmark has accepted a number of refugees from countries such as Iraq, 
Iran, Somalia and Vietnam.  
 According to the Danish Ministry of Integration (2006a), a total of six per cent of 
the Danish population are immigrants or descendants from non-Western countries. It is 
not easy to estimate the number of Muslims in Denmark because the authorities do not  
register religious denomination. Based on a careful analysis of a number of sources, 
Jacobsen (2007) estimates that the number of Muslims in Denmark ranged around 
207.000 in 2006. This corresponds to 3.8 per cent of the Danish population.  
 The structural societal position of minorities is clearly less favourable than that 
of native Danes. The rate of employment as well as the level of education and income 
is considerably lower among immigrants - and among the descendants (Ministry of 
Integration 2006b). 
 
Definitions 
 
Concepts such as ‘ethnicity’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘immigrant’ are contentious and difficult 
to define. In this article, we ‘ethnic groups’is used in accordance with  Smith’s  (2001, 
p. 13) ‘working definition’ where ethnie is defined as ”a named human community 
connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of  ancestry, shared memories, 
one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the 
elite”. 
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 The concepts of immigrant and descendant are regrettably limited to the technical 
definitions provided by Statistics Denmark since these definitions constitute the 
foundation for our data collection. According to Statistics Denmark an immigrant is 
defined as a person born abroad whose parents are both (or one of them if there is no 
available information on the other parent) foreign citizens or were both born abroad. If 
there is no available information on either of the parents and the person was born 
abroad, the person is also defined as an immigrant. This means that the category 
immigrant also includes refugees. 
 Statistics Denmark (2008) defines a descendant as a person born in Denmark 
whose parents (or one of them if there is no information on the other parent) are either 
immigrants or descendants with foreign citizenship. If there is no available information 
on either of the parents and the person in question is a foreign citizen, the person is also 
defined as a descendant. 
 Ethnic group refers to the country of origin as registered by Statistics Denmark. If 
a descendants has parents with different ethnicities, the descendants is assigned the 
ethnicity of his/her mother (for details, see Statistics Denmark 2008).   
 This assigned ethnicity does not necessarily correspond with the respondent’s 
perceived ethnic belonging. However, the data contain no information about the 
respondent’s self-reported ethnic origin – with one important exception: Respondents 
were asked if they were of Kurdish origin. A statistical analysis (Gundelach and 
Nørregård-Nielsen 2007) has shown that people who say they are Kurds do not differ 
significantly from other immigrants from the respective country of origin. A similar 
result was found in a survey among Turkish immigrants in Denmark (Necef 1996). A 
special problem relates to immigrants and refugees from the Balkans since Statistics 
Denmark only registers the state where the immigrant comes from. The first 
immigrants came to Denmark in the early 1970s from former Yugoslavia, and in the 
1990s, Denmark accepted a number of refugees primarily from Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
A comparison (not shown here) of the so-called guest workers from ex-Yugoslavia, 
their reunited family members and the refugees from the Balkan countries in the 1990s 
shows no significant difference in democratic values among these groups. This may be 
due to the fact that they come from roughly the same region of ex-Yugoslavia 
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(Fledelius 2006). For the purposes of this article, it seems acceptable to consider 
respondents from West Balkan as a single group.  
 Finally, ‘Danes’ refer to people who are not immigrants or descendants. It would 
be more correct to use the term ‘ethnic Danes’ as many immigrants are in fact Danish 
citizens, but the term ‘Danes’ has been chosen for the sake of brevity. 
 
Data 
 
Our survey was based on phone interviews with nine ethnic groups: Immigrants and 
descendants from Pakistan and Turkey, immigrants or refugees from West Balkan, 
Iraq, Iran and Vietnam, and Danes. Since this article concerns the possible relationship 
between Islam and democracy, the Vietnamese immigrants have not been included in 
the subsequent analysis because none of the Vietnamese respondents were Muslims. 
Among all the other ethnic minorities (except for the Danes), some or all of the 
respondents have stated that they are Muslims.  
 Among the ethnic minorities, only people who have lived in Denmark for three 
years or more were included in the survey. The three-year limit was chosen because 
Danish law grants the right to vote at local elections after three years residency in 
Denmark. 
 Compared to the general population, the age distribution among the immigrant 
groups is skewed. Almost all of the respondents were below 50 years of age. 
Consequently, the survey population was defined as persons aged 18-50. The largest 
immigrant group was the Turkish immigrants where the population was 22.587; the 
smallest group of immigrants was the Vietnamese (5.910 persons). Among 
descendants, only two groups had a size that permitted further study: Turkish 
descendants amounted to 5.967, and Pakistani descendants numbered 3.268.  
 Respondents were randomly chosen by civil registration number. Interviewers 
were bilingual and both immigrants and descendants could choose to be interviewed in 
Danish or in their mother tongue. About 500 persons in each ethnic group were 
interviewed. The average response rate was 54 per cent, varying between 67 per cent 
for Danes and 41 per cent for Pakistani descendants. The main reason for the relatively 
low response rate was the difficulty encountered when having to establish a clear 
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relation between the respondent’s civil registration number and his/her phone number. 
Once contact was established, the number of rejects was relatively small. In the tables, 
weights are used to compensate for the low response rate. In the statistical analyses, no 
weights were applied. 
 The number of ‘don’t know’ answers varied from question to question and 
between ethnic groups. In general, the ‘don’t know’ answers were lowest among 
Danes. As it is difficult to establish the reasons for such differences, ‘don’t know’ 
answers have been excluded from the analysis. All data may be obtained from the 
Danish Data Archive (DDA-21171). 
 
 
The dependent variables: Democratic values 
 
Democracy theory tells us that the term ‘democracy’ has at least two meanings: 
‘popular sovereignty’ and ‘the liberty of the individual members of 
society’(Thomassen 1995). The interpretation of these meanings and their interrelation 
varies in the different normative democracy theories, but that is of less relevance to the 
concerns of this article. For our purposes, the two-dimensional structure that these 
meanings suggest is of greater importance.  
 The first – ‘popular sovereignty’- will be termed democratic principles. This 
variable is operationalized in the following question: ‘What do you think about each of 
the following ways of governing Denmark? Having a democratic system’ (‘Very 
good’, ‘Fairly good’, ‘Fairly bad’, ‘Bad’, ‘Don’t know’). This question is part of a 
battery of four questions that has been used by the World Values Survey and the 
European Values Survey. The other three questions in the battery ask about support for 
‘Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections”, 
‘Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best 
for the country”, ‘Having the army rule the country”. These questions are sometimes 
combined in an index but in our data we could not find a satisfactory one dimensional 
structure for all groups. Therefore, the analysis only concerns the ‘democratic system’ 
question - the only question that use the word ‘democracy”. Analyses show that the 
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support for democratic principles is generally high in most Western countries (Fuchs, 
Guidorossi and Svensson 1995; Klingemann 1999).  
 The second dimension, democratic rights, is just as important for democracy as 
free elections. In the present survey, the variable is an index based on two questions: 
one on religious freedom and one on freedom of speech. Religious freedom has been 
called ‘the first freedom’ in the sense that freedom of conscience is both 
chronologically the first and may be seen as a precondition for other freedoms 
(Casanova 1994, p. 40). It is measured by the following question: ‘To what extent do 
you agree or disagree with the following statement: It is important that all people in 
Denmark have the possibility of carrying out their religious rituals and wearing 
religious symbols’(‘Strongly agree’, ‘Agree’, ‘Neither agree nor disagree’, ‘Disagree’, 
‘Strongly disagree’, ‘Don’t know’). 
 Freedom of speech and association is measured by the following question: ‘To 
what extent do you agree or disagree that all groups – even groups with extreme 
attitudes – should have the right to hold meetings and state their cause?’(‘Strongly 
agree’, ‘Agree’, ‘Neither agree nor disagree’, ‘Disagree’, ‘Strongly disagree’, ‘Don’t 
know’). 
 The two questions are positively correlated for all ethnic groups (γ between 0,12 
and 0,36. The  γ’s are significant except for the Pakistani descendants (cf. Table A.1). 
The low insignificant correlation in this group is due to the fact that the distribution of 
responses is very skewed: almost everybody answers ‘agrees strongly”. For each 
respondent the answers are added up. The sum varies between 2 and 10. This is 
recoded as follows: 2=1, 3=2, 4 or 5 = 3, other values = 4. If a question is answered 
‘don’t know’, the index is coded ‘don’t know’. 
 Democratic values are not just related to the formal structural arrangements in 
society but also to its political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963). Democratic culture 
has been measured in many ways. In our survey, we decided to develop a measurement 
for democratic values that was family related. If democratic culture pervades all 
institutions in society, it would also encompass the private sphere. Democratic culture 
in the family would mean that the individual members of the family have influence on 
their own life and are not subjected to any authoritarian family structure. Giddens have 
suggested a close relation between societal and family democracy. 
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There is only one story to tell about the family today, and that is of democracy..... 
Democracy in the public sphere involves formal equality, individual rights, 
public discussion of issues free from violence, and authority which is negotiated 
rather than given by tradition. The democratized family shares these 
characteristics. (Giddens 1998, p. 93).  
 
Family democracy may be studied through the relations between spouses or through 
the relationship between parents and their children. For the purpose of this article, 
values concerning the husband-wife relationship are less useful because marital 
relationships are heavily infused with gender roles issues. The parent-child 
relationship, by contrast, is less contaminated when it comes to democratic values. The 
index is based on the following question: ‘How much influence should a young 
person/parents have on the young person’s a) choice of partner or b) choice of 
education”. The respondents were asked to grade their answer according to a 10-point 
scale, where 1 reflected total decision power to the young person, and 10 suggested that 
parents should decide totally. There is a very high correlation (γ between 0,53 and 
0,70) between the two variables for all ethnic groups, cf. Table A1 . The two variables 
were entered into an index by adding the values of each variable, and the result 
subsequently divided into three groups: Index value 2 =  the young person has very 
high influence (code 1), Index value 3-6 = the young person has high influence (code 
2). Index value 7-20 = the young person has less influence (code 3). If one question is 
answered with a ‘don’t know’, the index is coded ‘don’t know’. 
  
Are Muslims less democratic than Christians? 
 
Table 1 reflects an initial overview of democratic values in the Christian majority and 
in the Muslim minorities. The denomination of the respondents is measured by a 
question on self-reported religiosity (‘What is your religion?”).  Non-believers have 
been excluded from the table. 
 
Figure 1. Model of democratic values for immigrants 
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The table presents an interesting and quite surprising result. The respective positions of 
the three groups vary according to which dimension of democratic values we 
investigate. When it comes to democratic principles – i.e. whether the respondent 
believes that a democratic system is good thing – the Danes score higher than the two 
other groups. The Danes’ high score on this variable is similar to what Svensson (2004) 
has reported from the European Values Survey 1999.  The two minority groups’ score 
are somewhat lower but still higher than what is found in many European countries and 
in the immigrants’ homelands (cf. Inglehart et al 2004). Consequently, we may 
conclude that the support for democratic principles is high among Danes and the ethnic 
minorities. 
 It is thought provoking that the support for democracy is considerably lower 
when it comes to the second aspect of democracy: Democratic rights. It is perhaps even 
more surprising that in a country that prides itself on democratic principles, Danes 
show a low level of acceptance of democratic rights when these rights concern the 
liberties of minorities. More than twice as many among the ethnic minorities are 
strongly in favour of democratic rights compared to the Danes. As we will discuss 
below, this discrepancy is probably related to the general dissociation from Islam found 
among many Danes. 
 Finally, the data shows a lower support for family democracy among the ethnic 
minorities that among the Danes. Although the difference is not that large, it is still 
significant. It may be explained by differences in family structure and family values 
among Danes and the ethnic minorities. In general, immigrant families are less 
individualistic, reflecting a more authoritarian culture than we see in Danish families. 
 This initial presentation of data shows that there is no reason to believe that there 
is a clash of civilizations among Danes and ethnic minorities. On the contrary, in two 
out of three democracy measures, the differences are fairly small. In the third 
dimension (democratic rights), the ethnic minorities are more democratic than the 
Danes. Since the ranking varies for different measures of democratic values, the pattern 
cannot be explained by reference to a single variable such as the religion of the 
respondent. Instead, the differences are probably best explained by the framework in 
which Danes’ generally perceive Islam. 
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The perception of Islam and the granting of democratic rights 
 
It is indeed striking that the Danes are the most positive group in relation the 
democratic system but the most reluctant when it come to accepting the constitutional 
rights of all citizens in relation to civil liberties. One explanation for this may be found 
in the framing of the questions and the survey itself. Based on in-depths interviews 
about democracy among Americans, Chong (1993) shows that people’s perception of 
concepts and their immediate social context greatly influence their way of answering 
survey questions. Finding themselves within the framework of a democratic 
constitution, people are generally positive when asked about relatively abstract 
democratic ideals. When it comes to specific civil liberties, however, the framing 
appears to become group-specific; respondents fear that their own liberties will be 
affected – even infringed – when applied to people of a different faith. 
  Since our survey was framed within the context of immigration it is likely that 
the respondents (Danes as well as ethnic minorities) read ‘neutral’ questions through 
the lens of current immigration debates and attitudes in Denmark. The wording of the 
question on religiosity may point in the same direction. Part of the question concerned 
the issue of whether people should have the right to carry religious symbols. Since the 
wearing of religious symbols is of little significance to most Danes, the perception of 
the question has probably been coloured by the Muslim headscarf debate, leading 
respondents to assume that the question only related to Islam. This may explain the low 
percentage of Danes in favour of religious freedom. An overview of survey evidence 
(Andersen 2002) has concluded that Danes seem to have particular resentment towards 
Islam. For many Danes, religion and ethnicity are intimately related. Therefore, an 
unfamiliar religion such as Islam might be mistrusted because it is perceived as 
offering an alternative allegiance – a potential negation of what it means to be Danish.  
 
Does living in Denmark breed democratic values? 
 
According to theories of political socialization, living in a society with democratic 
institutions and democratic rule will educate the individual in democratic values. 
Following this hypothesis, the individual’s democratic values will become stronger the 
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longer this person lives in a democratic country. Let us apply this general hypothesis to 
the three groups concerned here:  
1. Immigrants: the longer an immigrant has lived in Denmark, the more positive 
his/her democratic values will be. 
2. Comparing immigrants and descendants: Since immigrants have lived in 
Denmark for a shorter period, they are expected to have fewer democratic 
values than descendants. 
3. Comparing descendants and Danes: Since people in these two groups have 
lived in Denmark all their lives, there will be only minor differences in their 
democratic values.  
  
Immigrants: Length of stay and democratic values 
A socialization hypothesis predicts that immigrants who have stayed in Denmark for a 
longer period will have stronger democratic values than immigrants who have only 
recently arrived in Denmark. Pettersson’s (2007) analysis of world values survey data 
suggest, however, that the values among immigrants in Europe only change slowly. In 
contrast Camp’s (2003) study of Mexican Americans found that ‘Mexican Americans 
begin to adopt the American definition of democracy after having resided in the United 
States for only one year’(Camp 2003, p. 14). Later in the text, however, Camp modifies 
his conclusion.  It appears that it is not the length of stay as such but the immigrant’s 
language proficiency that is the more important determinant of his/her changing values. 
Camp does not present an interpretation of this conclusion, but his study implies that 
immigrants who command the language of the host country are more committed to 
adapting to the ways of their new country and will develop a stronger sense of 
belonging towards the host country.  
 We used Camp’s finding to create a statistical model where the three measures of 
democratic values are dependent variables. The intervening variables are: The 
respondent’s sense of belonging vis a vis Danish society, the respondent’s proficiency 
in Danish, and the length of the respondent’s stay in Denmark. The independent 
variable is ethnicity. Data was analyzed by so-called ‘chain graphical models’ 
(Lauritzen 1996) using strategies and techniques described by Kreiner (1996) 
integrating analyses of data with graphical theoretic analyses of Markov graphs. The 
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basic idea underlying analysis by graphical models is nearly identical with Rosenberg’s 
(1968) classic concepts of elaboration and specification in connection with analyses of 
conditional relationships. Rosenbergs’ concept of explanation corresponds to 
conditional independence of variables. The Markov graph is a statistical model that has 
no links between variables if the association between the variables can be completely 
explained by the remaining variables in the model. While Rosenberg and colleagues 
had to limit the analysis to fairly few variables the use of modern computers and allow 
for analysis of high-dimensional contingency tables. The statistical analysis uses the 
DIGRAM computer program (Kreiner 1989). Partial γ coefficients were used 
throughout the analysis to measure association among ordinal and/or dichotomous 
variables. Associations involving nominal variables were investigated using χ2 tests of 
conditional independence. The significance of test results was in all cases evaluated by 
Monte Carlo tests as described in Kreiner (1987). 
 This statistical analysis is chosen because of the character of the data.  Ethnicity, 
the core variable, is a nominal variable and the other variables are ordinal: This makes 
it problematic to use for instance traditional regression analysis. The advantage of the 
graphical model technique is that there are there are no statistical requirements for the 
character and distributions of the variables. Another advantage is that all variables can 
be included in the model from the outset of the analysis including all three dependent 
variables..   
 Figure 1 shows the result of our statistical analysis. 
 
Figure 1. Model of democratic values for immigrants 
 
The analysis renders the following result: Only ethnic group influences all three 
dependent variables. Furthermore, the analysis confirms Camp’s findings. The length 
of the respondent’s stay in Denmark correlates positively with language skills, but there 
is no direct relationship between length of stay and democratic values. The variable 
language skill only correlates with family democracy. The respondent’s sense of 
belonging to Danish society correlates positively with democratic principles and family 
democracy, but the attitude towards democratic rights only correlates with ethnicity. 
This leads us to conclude that ethnicity is the most important determinant of democratic 
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values, and furthermore that the length of stay in Denmark has only an indirect or no 
impact on respondents’ democratic values. In other words, our analysis refutes the 
socialization hypothesis (a result that supports Pettersson’s (2007) findings from 
Europe). 
 This result shows that primary socialization seem to be stronger than secondary 
socialization. Another explanation is that the living conditions of ethnic minorities may 
limit the impact of secondary socialization from the Danish society. The survey shows 
that only about half of the immigrants in Denmark have a paid job - in some cases, the 
immigrant’s job will not involve direct contact with Danes at all – and only 30 per cent 
have regular communication with Danes. Moreover, immigrants are typically married 
to someone with the same ethnicity as themselves.  This indicates that immigrants’ 
contact with Danish society is relatively limited and consequently that the probability 
for political socialization is relatively small. 
 
Immigrants and descendants 
Since descendants have been born in Denmark, the socialization hypothesis would 
predict that they have a stronger democratic mindset than that of their immigrant 
counterparts. Descendants have joined Danish schools, kindergartens and have 
generally had more intimate contact with Danish society. At the same time, however, 
they have grown up in a family that is different from the average Danish family, 
implying that their family socialization may conflict with the impact of societal 
institutions.  
  Only the Pakistani and Turkish minorities can be used for the comparison of 
immigrants and descendants as these are the only two groups that have lived in 
Denmark long enough for there to be second generation ethnic minority groups of a 
sufficient size to undertake analysis. A comparison of immigrants and descendants is 
complicated by the different age structure of the two groups. There are no descendants 
over 35 years of age in the data. For this reason, it is only possible to compare 
descendants and immigrants between the ages of 18 and 34. Table 2 shows the 
percentage of high the level of democracy values in the four ethnic groups; these 
groups have been further subdivided into two age groups (18-24 years of age and 25-24 
years of age). 
Page 16 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers  ethnic@surrey.ac.uk
Ethnic and Racial Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 17 
 
Table 2 about here. 
 
The scenario reflected by the table is somewhat complicated. Firstly, there are no 
significant differences between immigrants and descendants in relation to democratic 
principles, which support the general findings in relation to this variable. Secondly, in 
relation to family values, we might expect that descendants are more democratic than 
immigrants, but the table shows no general pattern here. Among the 18-24 year-olds, 
the Pakistani descendants are more democratic than their immigrant counterparts, but 
for the Turks, it is the other way around. Among the 25-34 year-olds, there is only a 
noticeable difference for the Turkish minorities, but here the correlation is reversed: 
Turkish descendants are more democratic than Turkish immigrants. These differences 
appear difficult to explain, but it looks as if their family values depend on the specific 
situation of the ethnic group.  Finally, as regards democratic rights there is no 
difference between descendants and immigrants in the 18-24 year age group. Among 
the 25-35 year-olds, descendants are, surprisingly enough, less democratic than the 
immigrants. In fact, it seems as if descendants are becoming more like the Danes (who 
are very low on democratic rights) than their parents’ generation (cf. Table 1).  This 
leads us to a closer analysis of the differences between descendants and Danes of the 
same age.  
 
Danes and descendants 
The best way of testing the denomination and socialization hypotheses is by comparing 
people of different denomination, who are all socialized in Danish society. We matched 
the descendants of Muslim faith with Christian Danes of the same age (18-34 years). 
 Table 3 presents an overview of the distribution of the three dependent 
democracy variables in these groups,  
  
Table 3 about here 
 
The figures in the table present a picture that we recognize from our general 
description. The Danes are generally more positive towards democratic rule, but their 
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tolerance towards freedom of speech and religious faith is lower than that of the ethnic 
minorities. When it comes to young people’s influence on their own life (choice of 
education and spouse), the difference between the ethnic groups is much smaller than 
when discussing more abstract democratic values. There is a significant difference 
between all the ethnic groups.  
 As the figures in the table reflect, value differences exist in spite of the fact that 
all three ethnic groups have gone through public education in Denmark. Thus, the 
hypothesis about formal socialization cannot be supported. The differences must be 
explained by other factors. One possibility is family socialization. Descendants are not 
only socialized by social institutions, they also received specific ethnic socialization 
through their family and network. 
 We lack general information about family socialization in Denmark. However, it 
would be reasonable to expect that at least some of the descendants have been exposed 
to relatively strong Islamic values in their families. Some of them may also have 
attended private Islam-oriented schools but we have no information about this in the 
data.  In the immigrant family, values are shaped both by the country of origin as well 
as the host society (Foner 1997). In many immigrant families, religion plays a much 
stronger role than in Danish families, whose lifestyle is generally quite secular. This 
returns us once more to Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ hypothesis. Is it plausible 
to assume that devout descendants have less democratic values, whereas religious faith 
among the Danes has no affect on their democratic values? 
 A multivariate statistical analysis – not shown here because space does not allow 
it  –  reflects that for Danes, there is no relationship between religious values and 
democratic values. Among descendants, however, democratic values are influenced by 
the religion of the respondent, but there is no difference in democratic values between 
the Pakistani or Turkish respondents. Figure 2 shows the distribution of democratic 
values for people with strong religious faith (who report themselves to be ‘very 
religious’ or ‘somewhat religious’) and people who are less devout (who say that they 
are ‘not very religious’).   
 
Figure 2. Democratic values by religiosity among Pakistani and Turkish descendants. 
Per cent.  
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The differences between ‘very’ and ‘less devout’ descendants are relatively small, but 
there is a tendency for the more religious respondents to be less attracted to democratic 
principles and family democracy and to value religious freedom and freedom of speech 
higher. This result may be interpreted with reference to Fukuyama’s (2006) hypothesis 
about identity politics among young Muslims. Fukuyama argues that when Muslims 
move from traditional Muslims societies to Western societies, they experience an 
existential disparity between their inner identity as member of a Muslim cultural 
community and their exterior lives and behaviour in their new European context. 
According to Fukuyama, this disparity is particularly prominent among descendants. 
‘Stuck between two cultures with which they cannot identify, they find a strong appeal 
in the universalistic ideology offered by contemporary jihadism’(Fukuyama 2006, p. 
11). 
 While there is no indication in the data that there is a strong fundamentalist 
Islamic minority in Denmark, Fukuyama’s observation may contain some truth, 
especially for the more religious second generation immigrants for the simple reason 
that this group is more exposed to the pressures of different value systems.  Such an 
interpretation is supported by an interesting finding in our survey: When asked whether 
they feel that they have become more religious during the last three years, 37 per cent 
of the descendants answer in the affirmative, compared to 26 per cent of the 
immigrants from the same ethnic groups, and 9 per cent of the Danes. Another viable 
explanation is found in the fact that the descendants may feel that their religion is being 
discriminated against by the native majority; this leads them to put more emphasis on 
their right to religious freedom and freedom of speech.  
 
Is religion more important than ethnicity in relation to democratic values? 
 
Generally, it is difficult to distinguish between ethnicity and religion because most of 
the immigrants only belong to one denomination: Islam. As has been shown above, the 
respondent’s degree of devoutness has an influence on his/her democratic values, but in 
the following we shall explore whether differences in democratic values are higher 
within ethnic groups or within religious groups. If a religious explanation were to be 
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substantiated, it would mean that the democratic values of Muslims are relatively 
similar irrespective of their ethnicity.  This hypothesis is challenged by an ethnicity 
hypothesis, which claims that differences among ethnic groups are greater than those 
among denominations due to the impact of common history and destiny. An analysis of 
these hypotheses can only be conducted among ethnic groups with a varied 
composition of denomination, i.e. immigrants from Iran, Iraq and West Balkan. 
 Figure 3 shows the distribution of democratic values among the mixed ethnic-
religious groups. 
 
Figure 3. Democratic values among three groups of Muslim immigrants. Per cent. 
 
The statistical tests show that there are no significant differences in democratic values 
among the denominational groups in each ethnicity group. This strongly supports the 
ethnicity hypothesis - i.e. that the destiny and living conditions of a certain group are 
the more important determinants of a democratic mindset. However, if an ethnicity 
hypothesis should be supported, it would also require significant differences among the 
Muslims in all ethnic groups. This is precisely what we see in Figure 3. For each 
variable, there are significant differences among the ethnic groups. Thus, there is no 
basis for arguing that Muslim respondents are less democratic than non-Muslims 
respondents.   
 In all three cases, Muslims from Iraq have the strongest democratic values, 
followed by Muslims from Iran and Muslims from West Balkan. This result is difficult 
to interpret but might be explained by the history of the three countries or perhaps with 
reference to the different types of Islam that characterize the groups (e.g. Sunni, Shia). 
Unfortunately, no data exists that may support such a conclusion.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Besides being of interest in their own right, studies of ethnic minorities tell us a lot 
about the host society (Davie 2007). Often, the conclusions drawn by such studies have 
been relatively unclear because researchers only study the ethnic minorities and not the 
majority. In this respect, the present study is an exception because it includes data on 
the ethnic majority (the Danes) as well as data on a number of ethnic minorities. 
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 Our study undertaken has used three variables to measure democratic values: The 
support for democratic principles, democratic rights and family democracy. The study 
concludes that the support for democratic rights is high among the ethnic minorities as 
well as the majority population. Even though minorities show less support for 
democratic principles, they still score higher than the populations of many West 
European countries. As regards family democracy, there appears to be a similar pattern 
as for democratic principles (but we have no information about the distribution of 
family values in other European countries). The most important difference is found in 
the support for democratic rights - the freedom of speech and freedom of religion. 
Here, the Danish majority population is much less democratic than the ethnic 
minorities. Thus, democratic values do not give rise to a clash of civilizations, as 
Huntington would have it - at least not when we consider immigrants in Western 
Societies. Contrary to what Huntington’s thesis suggests, Christian Danes are less 
democratic than Muslim immigrants when it comes to granting democratic rights to all 
members of society. 
 Generally, democratic values do not differ between immigrants and descendants 
of the same ethnic group, and a change in values does not appear to depend on the 
length of stay in the host society. These results emphasize the role of ethnic belonging 
rather than the denomination or socio-economic factors.  For instance, we found that 
among ethnic minorities with a mixed religious composition, the differences between 
Muslims are greater than the in-minority differences.  
 These results support our general findings: Ethnicity is more important for 
democratic values than denomination. Ethnicity is important because of the common 
history and destiny of the various ethnic groups. This ‘ethnic habitus’ means that 
democratic values are based on a common history and fate and reproduced within 
ethnic groups primarily through social interaction and a shared language within the 
group.  
 The importance of ethnicity might not come as a surprise to sociologists. As 
noted by Davie (2007), immigrant populations arrive in Europe and their experiences 
vary for specific historical reasons. The Muslim headscarf, for instance, is an 
acceptable part of public life in Britain, but not in France. In Denmark, the headscarf is 
quite common in public life but also a highly contested symbol. The difference in 
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acceptance of foreign symbols and customs need to be understood in the context of the 
individual country’s history. Denmark has a history of a strong nation-religion 
relations, and has been dominated by a single denomination. It would be interesting to 
study whether other countries sharing the same characteristics also appear to be less 
willing to accept the democratic rights of all citizens. 
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Table 1. Democratic values among religious groups in Denmark. Per cent.  
 Democratic 
principles 
Very high 
Democratic 
rights 
Very high 
Family 
democracy 
Very high 
Number of 
respondents 
Christian 
Danes 
89 21 64 371-376 
Muslim 
descendants 68 53 51 
911-949 
Muslim 
immigrants 74 53 51 
1848-1939 
 χ2 =  60.115; 
df= 6; 
p= 0,000 
χ2 =  202.664;  
df= 6; 
p= 0,000 
χ2 =  46.829;  
df= 4; 
p= 0,000 
 
Notes: The entries show the percentage in the most democratic category. Data is weighted to compensate for 
bias in the data collection but not according to the size of the national minorities in the Danish population. 
For operationalization of democratic variables, see text..  
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Table 2. Percentage with high democratic values by age and national group.  
 Democratic 
principles 
Democratic 
rights 
Family democracy 
Age 18-24 25-34 18-24 25-34 18-24 25-34 
Pakistan descendant 71 68 54 51 52 45 
Pakistan immigrant 76 73 59 65 28 40 
Turkey descendant 75 78 55 49 54 61 
Turkey immigrant 77 72 54 65 66 49 
Note: Ellipses show significant difference between descendents and immigrants in the same ethnic 
group (χ2, p<0,05)  when controlled for age. 
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Table 3.  Democratic values among Turkish and Pakistani descendants and Danes aged 18-34. 
Per cent. 
 Democratic 
Principles  
Very high 
Democratic 
rights 
Very high 
Family 
democracy 
Very high 
Number of 
respondents 
Danes 90 23 61 231-235 
Pakistan 
descendants 
69 53 49 469-488 
Turkey 
descendants 
76 53 56 477-504 
 χ2 = 39,732,  
df = 6;  
p= 0,000 
χ2 = 106,816,  
df= 6;  
p = 0,000 
χ2 = 36,591,  
df = 4;  
p= 0,000. 
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Figure 1. Model of democratic values for immigrants 
 
 
 
Note: The analysis is based on graphical modelling. A line shows a significant relationship. Figures are 
partial   γ- coefficients. Such cannot be computed with national group because the variable is nominal. In 
these cases, the measure of association is  χ2. Only significant γ’s above 0,10 are reported. The analysis 
includes five immigrant groups (from Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and West Balkan). 
Family 
democracy 
Democratic 
principles 
Democratic 
rights 
Language 
skills 
Years in 
Denmark 
Ethnic 
 group 
Belonging to 
Denmark 
-0,15 
0,11 
0,25 
0,21 
0,33 
0,16 
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Note: The differences between the high and low religiosity categories are significant.  
Democratic principles γ = -0,21 p = 0,009; democratic rights γ =  0,17 p = 0,008; family 
democracy = - 0,18, p = 0,006.
Figure 2. Democratic values by religiosity among 
Pakistani and Turkish descendants. Per cent. 
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Note: The differences between the national groups are significant. Democratic principles χ2 = 41,018, df=6, 
p=0,000;   democratic rights χ2 = 99,702, df=6, p=0,000; family democracy χ2 = 14,867, df=4, p=0,005. 
 
 
Figure 3. Democratic values among three groups of 
Muslim immigrants. Per cent. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Democratic 
principles 
Democratic 
rights 
Family 
democracy 
Per cent 
Iraq 
Iran 
West Balkan 
Page 32 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers  ethnic@surrey.ac.uk
Ethnic and Racial Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
Table A.1 Correlations between the variables in the index.  
 Correlations between the two 
questions on democratic rights 
Correlations between the two 
questions on family democracy 
Number of 
respondents 
 γ p γ p  
Turkey 
immigrant 
0,35 0,002 0,60 0,000 486-504 
Turkey 
descendant 
0,21 0,047 0,53 0,000 498-505 
Pakistan 
immigrant 
0,36 0,008 0,57 0,000 420-434 
Pakistan 
descendant 
0,12 0,313 0,62 0,000 477-488 
West Balkan 
immigrant  
0,21 0,001 0,66 0,000 483-503 
Irak immigrant 0,36 0,01 0,67 0,000 491-513 
Iran 
immigrant 
0,14 0,06 0,70 0,000 492-506 
Danes 0,31 0,00 0,69 0,000 515-521 
Note: Don’t know answers are excluded. For wording of questions see text. 
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